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An emerging literature in finance examines the potential link between gambling behavior 
and financial market outcomes. Theory predicts that investors would be willing to accept a 
negative return premium for stocks with positively skewed returns (e.g., Shefrin and Statman 
(2000), Brunnermeier, Gollier, and Parker (2007), Mitton and Vorkink (2007), and Barberis and 
Huang (2008)). Stocks with lottery like payoffs are overpriced in the short run and earn a negative 
average risk adjusted return in the long run. Empirical research on the effects of gambling attitudes 
has typically focused on the cross-sectional variation in gambling preferences and their impact on 
financial market outcomes. For example, Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2011) find that investors’ 
gambling preferences varying geographically impact stock returns as well as corporate policies. 
In this paper, we study how the time variation in overall gambling attitudes affects various 
stock market outcomes. Attention to salient information on gambling events with large potential 
payoffs could motivate investors to become less risk averse. Prior literature from psychology and 
neuroscience documents that positive emotions, such as excitement generated by successful 
outcomes, induce individuals to take more risks and become more confident in future investment 
decisions (Bjork, Knutson, Fong, Caggiano, Bennett, and Hommer (2004), Kuhnen and Knutson 
(2011)). Kluger and DeNisi (1996) show that affective psychological reactions have “automatic 
and pervasive” effects on tasks in other settings. It is not clear, however, whether gambling 
sentiment predicts stock market outcomes. 
We posit that gambling sentiment induced by large payoffs in one setting may influence 
individuals’ investment decisions in other related economic settings. Specifically, we conjecture 
that an increase in overall sentiment toward gambling is likely to generate a positive spillover 
effect on investor demand for stocks with lottery characteristics, leading to positive price pressure 
on lottery stocks. Consequently, if arbitrage costs are high, the return of these stocks may be 
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predictable in the short run. In addition, corporate financial decisions could be affected as firms 
respond to changes in investors’ gambling attitudes and their impact on asset prices. 
To directly test these conjectures, we develop a novel measure of investors’ gambling 
sentiment based on Google’s search volume intensity (SVI) on lottery related keywords. It 
measures the time variation in investors’ overall propensity to gamble, and captures broader 
information than gambling events such as jackpot drawings or casino openings, which have been 
used in the recent literature. 
We first examine the effects of gambling sentiment on stock returns. We focus on a 
segment of the U.S. stock market in which stocks have lottery like return distributions. Following 
Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2016), we define lottery stocks as those with low nominal share prices, 
high idiosyncratic skewness, and high idiosyncratic volatility. These stocks are also associated 
with low average returns, high return volatility and high turnover (Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), 
Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009), and Dorn and Sengmueller 
(2009)). 
We conjecture that lottery stocks are likely to be more influenced by gambling sentiment 
than non-lottery stocks (i.e., stocks with high stock price, low idiosyncratic skewness, and low 
idiosyncratic volatility). Specifically, if stronger gambling sentiment induces risk taking behavior 
in the stock market, investor demand for lottery stocks would increase. As the arbitrage costs are 
likely to be high for lottery stocks given their low prices and high volatility, this excess demand in 
turn could generate price pressure on lottery stocks and generate positive abnormal returns in the 
short run (i.e. the spillover hypothesis). 
Consistent with the spillover hypothesis, we find that when the gambling sentiment of 
investors becomes stronger, lottery stocks earn positive abnormal returns over the next two weeks. 
A one-standard-deviation increase in investors’ gambling sentiment predicts an abnormal return 
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of 11 basis points per week (5.4% per annum) for the lottery stock portfolio in two weeks’ time. 
Importantly, the result is similar if we control for attention-grabbing jackpots in our gambling 
sentiment measure, suggesting that our measure contains value relevant information beyond 
information from jackpots. Further, the effect is 4 times larger around the 2008 financial crisis, 
consistent with investors having a greater propensity to gamble during recessions (Kumar (2009)).  
To directly examine whether shifts in overall gambling attitudes affect investor demand for 
lottery stocks, we use two transaction level datasets to study investor trading behavior. We first 
use retail investors’ trading data from a major U.S. discount brokerage firm (Barber and Odean, 
2000) to study the impact of lottery jackpots on investor trading from 1991 to 1996. We find that 
large jackpots are associated with excess stock buy sell imbalance of 3% on the next trading day, 
which indicates a 3% increase in the net purchase of lottery stocks by retail investors relative to 
non-lottery stocks. Further, using TAQ data on stock transactions from 2004 to 2014 for the 
aggregate U.S. market, we show that large lottery jackpots are also associated with 0.37% excess 
order imbalance of lottery stocks next day, which has a smaller effect than those from retail trading 
data as TAQ covers the aggregate market including trades by institutional investors. Overall, our 
results on investor demand using retail and aggregate market data are consistent with our return 
predictability results, and suggest that stronger gambling sentiment would induce investors to take 
more risks in the stock market. 
In the next set of tests, we examine the extent to which geographical differences in 
gambling sentiment influence the long-term performance of lottery stocks. As local investors’ 
gambling sentiment varies across regions (Kumar et al. (2011)), we posit that the effects of 
gambling sentiment on stock returns would be stronger among U.S. states with stronger gambling 
sentiment. In these states, lottery stocks are more likely to be overpriced in the short run and are 
likely to underperform in the long run. To test our prediction, we use each firm’s headquarter state 
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to define its location and use the state level SVI, which measures Internet searches from each state, 
to capture the gambling sentiment of local investors. 
We find that in states with strong gambling sentiment, a trading strategy that goes long in 
lottery stocks and goes short in non-lottery stocks underperforms by 70 basis points per month 
(8.4% per annum) based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. The results are stronger for 
stocks with lower institutional ownership or headquartered in states with stronger local bias. In 
contrast, in U.S. states with relatively weaker gambling sentiment, lottery stocks do not perform 
differently from non-lottery stocks. 
Next, we change our perspective and investigate whether gambling sentiment affects 
corporate decisions. Low nominal share price is a salient feature of lottery stocks. Baker, 
Greenwood, and Wurgler (2009) show that investors’ demand for stocks with low nominal share 
prices is time varying. Further, firms cater to such demand by splitting stocks with high nominal 
share prices. We conjecture that the time varying demand for the low-priced stocks would be 
related to the time variation in investors’ gambling attitudes. Consistent with this conjecture, we 
find that firms with high nominal share prices are more likely to split their shares when investors 
exhibit stronger gambling sentiment. The predicted probability of announcing stock splits for high-
priced stocks is 0.07% per month higher following high gambling sentiment periods than low 
sentiment periods, which is economically significant given the average unconditional probability 
of stock splits of 0.10% per month. 
In the last set of tests, we examine the effects of gambling sentiment on the first day returns 
of initial public offerings (IPOs). These tests are motivated by previous research, which 
demonstrates that IPOs are often perceived as lotteries by investors (Barberis and Huang (2008), 
Green and Hwang (2012)). Further, Loughran and Ritter (2004) show that the magnitude of the 
average first day return for IPOs changes over time. We conjecture that IPOs would earn higher 
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first day returns when investors exhibit stronger gambling sentiment. Consistent with this 
conjecture, we find that a one-standard-deviation increase in investors’ gambling sentiment is 
associated with a 1.36% increase in the average first day IPO return in the following month. 
Overall, these findings suggest that changes in investors’ gambling attitudes have a positive 
spillover effect on stock market outcomes. When investors’ gambling sentiment becomes stronger, 
stocks with lottery characteristics earn positive abnormal returns in the short run as investor 
demand for these stocks increases, and firms with high nominal share prices are more likely to 
split their shares. In addition, initial public offerings earn higher first day returns during these 
periods of high gambling sentiment. Further, lottery stocks earn negative returns in the long run 
and the sentiment-return relation is stronger among low institutional ownership firms, 
headquartered in regions where gambling is more acceptable and local bias is stronger. 
Our findings contribute to at least three distinct strands of finance literature. First, we 
contribute to the finance literature on skewness and gambling (e.g., Kumar (2009), Doran, Jiang, 
and Peterson (2012), Dorn, Dorn, and Sengmueller (2014), Gao and Lin (2014), and Liao (2017)). 
Our results provide new evidence on the potential link between the gambling market and the stock 
market. Previous studies examine investors’ ex-post reactions to gambling events. Using a broader 
measure of investors’ propensity to gamble, we find a positive spillover effect in the U.S. stock 
market. These findings suggest that shifts in gambling propensity over time predict stock returns, 
investor demand, and corporate policies. 
Second, we provide new evidence on the economic effects of investor attention (e.g., 
Odean (1999), Barber and Odean (2008), Palomino, Renneboog, and Zhang (2009), Da, 
Engelberg, and Gao (2011), (2015)). Specifically, we show that salient gambling events trigger 
strong gambling sentiment, which generates return predictability among lottery stocks. 
6 
 
Third, we add to the catering literature in corporate finance. In particular, our results 
provide new insights into the managerial motivation behind stock splits (e.g., Lakonishok and Lev 
(1987), Angel (1997), Baker et al. (2009)) and provide an alternative explanation for the time 
variation in first day IPO returns (e.g., Loughran and Ritter (2004)). Specifically, we show that 
firms cater to the time varying demand for lottery characteristics (i.e., low nominal share prices) 
by splitting stocks with high nominal share prices. In addition, we demonstrate that time variation 
in investors’ gambling sentiment is an important determinant of first day IPO returns. 
II. Hypotheses Development  
We consider four different economic settings to study the impact of gambling sentiment 
on financial market outcomes. In the first setting, we focus on the short-term mispricing and 
correction pattern among lottery stocks. The demand for lottery stocks can be positively correlated 
with that for lotteries (Kumar (2009)).1 Doran et al. (2012) find that during periods with higher 
participation rates in conventional gambling activities, investors also have a higher demand for 
lottery stocks. Higher lottery ticket sales represent a higher enthusiasm for gambling and generate 
excess return comovement among lottery stocks (Kumar et al. (2016)). In addition, Liao (2017) 
finds that the opening of casinos motivates nearby retail investors to increase the idiosyncratic risk 
of their stock portfolios. Relatedly, Kearney (2005) shows that households in the U.S. would 
finance an increase in lottery spending by a reduction in none gambling expenditures such as food 
and rent, rather than by substituting expenditures away from other forms of gambling.2 We posit 
 
1 A related economics literature on betting markets finds that state lotteries are complements to other forms of 
gambling. For example, the introduction of state lotteries increases the participation in casino gaming and horse racing 
(Scott and Garen (1994), Calcagno, Walker, and Jackson (2010)). In addition, different types of U.S. lotteries 
complement each other (Grote and Matheson (2007)).   
2 Another strand of literature shows that salient events in gambling markets could draw trading activities (measured 
by trading volume or market participation) away from the stock market. Gao and Lin (2014) show that retail investors 
in Taiwan reduce stock trading activities following large jackpots. Dorn et al. (2014) report similar evidence for 




that, if lottery stocks are perceived as lotteries, investors are likely to invest disproportionally more 
in lottery stocks when gambling sentiment is strong, leading to positive price pressure on these 
stocks given arbitrage costs are likely to be high. To summarize, our first hypothesis posits: 
H1 (Spillover hypothesis): Following periods of high gambling sentiment, lottery stocks 
would earn positive abnormal returns in the short run. 
Our second hypothesis focuses on the cross-sectional variation in the impact of shifts in 
gambling sentiment on stock returns. Barberis and Huang (2008) show that investors with 
gambling attitudes are willing to accept a negative return premium for stocks with positively 
skewed returns. As investors are known to exhibit local bias (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz (1999), 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2008), Seasholes and Zhu (2010)), the 
effects of gambling sentiment on stock returns would be stronger for stocks headquartered in states 
with stronger gambling attitudes. Further, we expect a larger impact on stocks that are more likely 
to be held by retail investors (i.e., with lower institutional ownership) and on firms headquartered 
in states with strong local bias. For stocks located in states with relatively weaker gambling 
attitudes, the negative lottery stock premium would be weaker or not existent. 
To summarize, our second hypothesis posits: 
H2: The effects of gambling sentiment on stock returns would be stronger in U.S. states 
with stronger gambling attitudes. Further, this impact is likely to be amplified among stocks with 
lower institutional ownership and firms headquartered in states with strong local bias. 
 
It is worth noting that the evidence of reduced stock trading volume does not necessarily imply a negative pricing 
impact as stock market investors could reduce both buy and sell orders following large jackpots (Gao and Lin (2014)). 
In Sections IV.C and IV.D, we will discuss our results on the investor demand of lottery stocks following large 
jackpots in the U.S. 
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Our third hypothesis focuses on managerial response to changes in investors’ gambling 
attitudes and their potential impact on asset prices. Weld, Michaely, Thaler, and Benartzi (2009) 
show that firms keep their nominal share prices in a particular range by conducting stock splits. 
Baker et al. (2009) propose a catering theory of nominal share prices to explain this behavior. They 
find that the demand for low-priced stocks is time varying and firms with high nominal share prices 
split their shares when such demand is high. So far, the literature has not clearly identified what 
drives the time varying demand for low-priced stocks. 
We posit that the demand for low-priced stocks would at least partially be related to the 
gambling sentiment of investors. Since low nominal share price is a salient feature of lottery stocks, 
stronger gambling sentiment would increase the demand for low-priced stocks and raise their share 
prices. Firms with high share prices would cater to this excess demand by splitting their shares. In 
contrast, firms with low nominal share prices would not split their shares.3 
To summarize, our third hypothesis is: 
H3: Firms with high share prices would exhibit a higher propensity to split their stocks 
when investors exhibit stronger gambling sentiment. 
Our fourth hypothesis relates to another corporate finance anomaly, i.e., IPO underpricing. 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) show that the initial stock return after IPOs changes over time. IPOs 
could be perceived as lotteries, given their positively skewed returns (Barberis and Huang (2008), 
Green and Hwang (2012)). Hence the time variation in the IPO underpricing could be related to 
investors’ gambling sentiment. If investors treat IPOs as lottery investment opportunities, they 
 
3 If the low-priced firms split shares, they would face substantial delisting risks. For example, for a firm with share 
price of $8, below the median share price of the CRSP universe of $14, a typical split ratio of 2 to 1 brings the share 
price down to $4. Practitioners often believe that firms with share price below $5 to have substantial delisting risk 
(Market Watch: http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nyse-euronext-seeks-relax-minimum-bid). In addition, firms 
cannot easily undo their splits by undertaking reverse splits, as this would give negative signals to the market (e.g., 
Woolridge and Chambers, 1983; Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi, 2008; Macey, O’Hara, and Pompilio, 2008). 
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would be willing to pay a higher price for IPOs when their gambling sentiment is strong. This 
could generate a larger average first day IPO return. 
Overall, our fourth hypothesis posits that: 
H4: The average first day IPO return would be higher during periods of high gambling 
sentiment. 
III. Data and Methodology 
To test these four hypotheses, we collect data from various sources. In this section, we 
describe those data sets and our measure of gambling sentiment.  
A. Measures of Gambling Sentiment 
Motivated by Da et al. (2011), we use the search volume intensity (SVI) for lottery related 
searches from Google to capture investors’ gambling sentiment. Specifically, we use SVIs for the 
topic “Lottery” from Google Trends for the U.S region.4 SVI measures the popularity of a search 
term relative to all other terms from the same location at the same time. An increase in SVI 
indicates that people pay more attention to the topic than they normally do. The time-series of SVI 
is available from 2004. 
Following Da et al. (2011), our main variable is the abnormal search volume intensity 
(ASVI) for the topic “Lottery”: 
(1)                                                  ASVIt = LogSVIt – LogSVIt-1,  
where ASVIt is the abnormal search volume intensity for the topic “Lottery” in time t. LogSVIt 
and LogSVIt-1 represent the natural logarithm of SVIs in time t and time t-1, respectively. We use 
 
4 While the original Google search data reports search volume for a single text string, searches on topics provide a 
more comprehensive measure of overall attention by aggregating searches in different languages and different text 




both monthly and weekly SVIs, depending on the appropriate frequency of the tests.5 ASVI 
measures changes in people's attention toward lottery related events. 
To study the geographical variation in gambling attitudes, we use the “interest by 
subregion” function in Google Trends to download the cross-sectional search interests in the topic 
“Lottery” during each calendar year.6 We use the state level SVIs in the previous year to sort all 
U.S. states and Washington D.C. into two groups. We define a state or Washington D.C. as strong 
(weak) gambling sentiment states if it has above (below) median cross-sectional SVI in the 
previous year. 
B. Validating the Gambling Sentiment Measure 
To test whether our measure of gambling sentiment is reasonable, we obtain state lottery 
sales data and state level demographic data from the U.S. Census Bureau. State lottery sales data 
are from the 2017 annual survey of state government finances tables while state population data 
are from the 2017 U.S. population estimates. We collect news data from Factiva. 
In the first validation test, we examine whether our measure of gambling sentiment 
correlates with news about state lotteries and other forms of gambling. Panel A of Figure A1 in 
the Appendix plots the “Lottery” SVI for the U.S. Using Factiva, we find that nearly all peaks 
(Points A to L) in the series coincide with the dates of the attention-grabbing jackpots from the 
two largest U.S. games, i.e., Mega Millions and Powerball. These jackpots are either record 
 
5 In the current version of Google Trends, the frequency of the search data depends on the selected time range. When 
choosing a time range that is longer than 5 years, Google will report monthly frequency SVI. In contrast, Google 
returns weekly frequency SVI when a time range shorter than 5 years is selected. Therefore, we download monthly 
frequency SVI by choosing 2004 to 2018 as our time range. To obtain weekly frequency SVI, we download weekly 
SVI in three subsamples: 2004 to 2008, 2009 to 2013, and 2014 to 2018. We specify the download period such that 
the adjacent time ranges share a common week, which we use to adjust the time-series to ensure comparability over 
time. 
6 The state level SVIs are calculated on a scale from 0 to 100 during the selected time frame (i.e., every calendar year). 
A higher value means a higher proportion of all search queries in that state, not a higher absolute query count. 




breaking or near record at the time. Details of these jackpots are reported in Table A2 in the 
Appendix.7 As expected, the time-series correlation between ASVI and these jackpots is high at 
55% (see Table A1 in the Appendix). Therefore, in our main empirical tests, we also use jackpot 
adjusted ASVI to study the incremental effects of gambling sentiment beyond attention-grabbing 
jackpots.8 In unreported tests, we also find that other gambling events such as the Super Bowl, i.e. 
the biggest gambling event of a year, also raise SVI. 
Next, we analyze how our state level SVI relates to the demographic characteristics of local 
investors. Table 1 presents the top five and bottom five states during the 2004 to 2018 period. 
Massachusetts has one of the highest levels of Catholic concentration and it also has one of the 
highest SVIs during our sample period. In contrast, Utah has the highest level of Mormon 
concentration and it has the lowest SVI. This is consistent with the findings of  Kumar et al. (2011) 
who show that Catholics are more likely to gamble while Mormons have a strong opposition to 
gambling. 
In 2017, the median lottery sales value is $3 billion for the top gambling sentiment states. 
This is 28 times greater than that of the bottom states. Similarly, the median per capita lottery sales 
($303) for the top five gambling sentiment states is also about 3 times higher than that ($117) of 
 
7 It is important to note that large jackpots do not assure investor attention. The lottery literature (e.g., Williams and 
Siegel (2013)) shows that lottery players have jackpot fatigue: the excitement brought by a jackpot depends on its 
relative size with respect to other jackpots in the recent period. Investors could lose interest in buying lottery tickets 
even when the outstanding jackpot is large. In recent years, both Powerball and Mega Millions experience jackpot 
fatigue. Panel B of Figure A1 in the Appendix depicts the “Lottery” SVI for two large jackpots with similar size. 
When the national jackpot is $390 million, a near-record 336 million Mega Million jackpot in August 2009 raises 
SVI. In contrast, a $326 million jackpot in November 2014 does not attract attention as the national record increases 
to $656 million. Therefore, our gambling sentiment measure is a more direct measure of investor attention to gambling 
than jackpots. 
8 Table A1 in the Appendix reports the contemporaneous time-series correlations among ASVI and variables that are 
likely to affect investors’ gambling propensity. These variables include a dummy variable that identifies attention-
grabbing jackpots in Table A2, the Baker and Wurgler (2007) investor sentiment index, and the five commonly used 
macroeconomic variables. We find that ASVI has very low correlations with the investor sentiment index and the 




the bottom five states. Further, all the top five states have legalized state lotteries. In contrast, three 
out of the bottom five states have not adopted state lotteries by 2018 (i.e., no state lottery sales). 
This is consistent with the findings of Kumar et al. (2011) who show that regions with stronger 
gambling propensity legalize state lotteries earlier.9 Overall, the validation test results indicate that 
our measure of gambling sentiment is reasonable, and captures broader information than proxies 
used in the prior literature. 
C. Lottery Stocks 
To analyze the influence of shifts in investors’ gambling sentiment on stock market 
outcomes, we focus on lottery stocks for our first two economic settings. Our definition of lottery 
stocks follows that of Kumar et al. (2016), which is a continuous measure of the “lotteriness” of 
stocks. This measure is based on the theoretical framework developed in Harvey and Siddique 
(2000) and Barberis and Huang (2008). It is also motivated by the empirical definition of lottery 
stocks in Kumar (2009).10 
Specifically, we use the following three measures to construct the Lottery Index (LIDX): 
nominal stock price, idiosyncratic skewness, and idiosyncratic volatility. Stock price is the closing 
price on the last trading day of the previous calendar year. Idiosyncratic skewness is the third 
moment of the residuals obtained by fitting a two-factor model using daily stock returns in the 
previous year, where the two factors are the excess market returns and the squared excess market 
returns. And, idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation of residuals from the Carhart (1997) 
model using daily stock returns in the previous year. We obtain price, return, and market 
 
9 We also report the geographical differences in gambling sentiment for each state during the 2004 to 2018 period in 
Panel C of Figure A1 in the Appendix. We find that the Internet search volume for the topic “Lottery” is higher in the 
West and the East coasts and is lower in the Central region. 
10 Our results remain quantitatively similar if we use MAX as an alternative definition of lottery stocks, as in Bali, 




capitalization data at monthly and daily frequencies from the Center for Research on Security 
Prices (CRSP). The size, market to book, and momentum factors are from Kenneth French's data 
library.11 
In January of each year, we assign all common stocks (with a share code of 10 or 11) in 
the CRSP universe into twenty groups based on each criterion. We conduct the three sorting 
independently and create 60 groups. Group 20 (1) contains the stocks with the highest (lowest) 
idiosyncratic skewness, highest (lowest) idiosyncratic volatility, or lowest (highest) price. We then 
add up the group numbers of each stock to a score between 3 and 60 and standardize this score to 
a value between 0 and 1 using LIDX = (Score-3) / (60-3).12 Finally, we define lottery stocks as 
stocks with a top 30% LIDX value, non-lottery stocks as those with a bottom 30% LIDX value, 
and remaining stocks as other stocks. We update this list in January of each year. 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the main characteristics of lottery stocks. For comparison, we 
also report the characteristics of non-lottery stocks, other stocks, and all stocks in the CRSP 
universe. The average price of lottery stocks is $6.55, which is comparable in magnitude to the 
price of lottery tickets. Lottery stocks have a small average market capitalization of $306 million. 
As expected, they also have significantly higher volatility and skewness. 
D. Data on Trading and Jackpots 
To compare our results based on gambling sentiment with the effects of jackpots 
documented in the prior literature, we obtain trading data from both the Barber and Odean (2000) 
retail brokerage data and TAQ transaction level data for the aggregate market. The brokerage 
dataset contains all trades of a set of individual investors during the 1991 to 1996 period from a 
 
11 The risk factors are obtained from http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
12 For example, if stock A is in group 1 for idiosyncratic skewness, group 20 for idiosyncratic volatility, and group 20 
for price. The score for stock A equals to 1 + 20 + 20 = 51. We standardize this score to a value between 0 and 1: 
LIDX = (51 – 3)/60 – 3 = 0.84. 
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major U.S. discount brokerage house, while TAQ Monthly Product contains trading information 
of all investors till 2014. 
We obtain date and prize of each jackpot drawing from the Multi-State Lottery Association 
and the USA Mega website. The only multi-state lotto game during the brokerage sample period 
is Powerball.13 In comparison, there are two multi-state lotto games (i.e., Powerball and Mega 
Millions) during our TAQ sample from 2004 to 2014. 
E. Institutional Ownership and Local Bias Data 
Our second hypothesis posits that gambling sentiment would have a greater impact on 
stocks that are more likely to be held by retail investors (i.e., stocks with low institutional 
ownership) or headquartered in states with stronger local bias. Firm level institutional ownership 
data are collected from FactSet and based on Ferreira and Matos (2008).14 We measure a firm’s 
institutional ownership in a year by its average quarterly total domestic institutional ownership. 
The mean of total domestic institutional ownership is 55% for our sample period (see Panel B of 
Table 2). Low institutional ownership stocks are stocks with less than ten percent total institutional 
ownership. 
We construct trading based local bias using Barber and Odean (2000) retail brokerage data 
(Kumar and Koniotis (2013)). Specifically, local bias is defined as the difference in average values 
between actual local turnover (i.e., the percentage of total investor turnover in a firm that is by 
local investors) and expected turnover (i.e, average state level trading volume in the last four 
quarters over shares outstanding last quarter). The former measures the percentage of total investor 
turnover that is local, while the latter captures the expected level of trading across states following 
 
13 Prior to April 22, 1992, Powerball was called Lotto America. 
14 We use FactSet to measure institutional ownership because it has a larger coverage than Thomson’s 13f during our 
sample period from 2004 to 2018. Our results remain similar by using Thomson’s 13f dataset. 
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the Coval and Moskowitz (2001) method. We sort all U.S. states and the Washington D.C. by local 
bias into three groups with 17 states or district in each group. We define strong (moderate) (weak) 
local bias using the top (medium) (bottom) 17 states or Washington D.C.15 
F. Stock Splits Data 
Our third economic setting focuses on the implication of time varying gambling attitudes 
on stock splits. We include all common stocks in the U.S. and identify splitters as those with a 
CRSP distribution code of 5523. Following Lin, Singh, and Yu (2009), we require splitters to have 
a CRSP Factor to Adjust Price (FACPR) greater than or equal to one and equal to the CRSP Factor 
to Adjust Shares Outstanding (FACSHR). After dropping stocks without COMPUSTAT data, our 
sample includes 711 stock splits from June 2004 to 2018. The average monthly probability of stock 
splits is 0.10% (see Panel B of Table 2). 
G. IPO Data 
In our fourth economic setting, we analyze the effects of time varying gambling attitudes 
on first day returns of IPOs. We obtain the monthly average first day return on the “net IPOs”, age 
of IPO firms, number of Internet IPOs, and the hotness of IPO markets from Jay Ritter’s website.16 
The monthly average first day return is calculated as the equal-weighted average of the first day 
returns on all the offerings in a calendar month. During our sample period, the average IPO first 
day return is 13.72% (see Panel B of Table 2). 
IV. Empirical results 
 
15 Our results are quantitatively similar by using a ownership-based local bias measure, defined as the difference in 
average values between state-level actual local ownership (i.e., the market value of local investors’ holdings of firms 
headquartered in the state over the market value of all holdings by local investors) and expected ownership (i.e., the 
market value of all firms headquartered in the state over the market value of all firms). 
16 See http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. Net IPOs are IPOs excluding closed-end funds, REITs, 
acquisition companies, stocks with offer prices below $5, ADRs, limited partnerships, units, banks and S&Ls, and 
those not listed on CRSP, as defined in Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994). 
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A. Stock Return Predictability 
Our first hypothesis focuses on the impact of time varying gambling attitudes on stock 
returns. If elevated gambling sentiment increases the demand for lottery stocks and generates price 
pressure on these stocks, ASVI should have a positive impact on the abnormal return of lottery 
stocks in the short run. 
We use weekly returns in our return predictability tests, following Hou and Moskowitz 
(2005) and Da et al. (2011). To measure the abnormal return performance of lottery stocks, we use 
both the Carhart (1997) four-factor model and the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model as 
benchmarks. We estimate 52-week rolling window regressions and require all stocks to have at 
least 12 weeks of return data.17 Stock level abnormal return is calculated as the difference between 
weekly actual return and return estimated using factor loadings. The abnormal returns are then 
value weighted to obtain the portfolio return. 
Following Da et al. (2011), we estimate the following regression to determine if stock 
returns are predictable in the short run: 
(2)                    ARportfolio,t+n = α + βn×ASVIt +δ×FSIt + ϵt,  (n = 1, 2, 3, 4), 
where ARportfolio,t+n is the average abnormal return in week t+n of a stock portfolio weighted by 
market capitalization in week t+n-1, and FSI is the weekly financial stress index reported by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The coefficient βn measures the predictive power of ASVI with 
n lags. 
Table 3 reports the results on return predictability tests. The coefficient estimates in 
Column 1 support a positive spillover effect. The βn coefficients are positive in weeks 1 and 2 for 
the lottery stock portfolio, and statistically significant for week 2. In economic terms, a one-
 
17 Our results remain similar if we use 156-week (i.e., 3 years) rolling window regressions. 
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standard-deviation increase (i.e., 17%) in the ASVI for the topic “Lottery” predicts a significantly 
positive price change of 11 basis points in week 2, which suggests that it takes a couple of weeks 
for gambling sentiment to have spillover effects on stock prices. The coefficient estimates become 
negative in weeks 3 and 4, indicating a subsequent price reversal as the mispricing gets corrected. 
In economic terms, a one-standard-deviation increase in ASVI significantly reduces lottery stocks’ 
abnormal returns in week 4 by 10 basis points. In contrast to the lottery stock portfolio, ASVI does 
not have any power to predict the return of the non-lottery stock portfolio. Further, the estimates 
in Column 3 show that the return predictability is stronger when we Long lottery stocks and Short 
non-lottery stocks simultaneously. 
To study to what extent the return predictive power of ASVI is driven by jackpots, we use 
an alternative method to construct ASVI and estimate return predictability regressions. 
Specifically, we regress our baseline ASVI on the attention-grabbing jackpot dummy and use the 
residuals as jackpot adjusted ASVI. As presented in Columns 4 to 6 of Table 3, we find that results 
are quantitatively similar after accounting for the effects of attention-grabbing jackpots. Further, 
Columns 7 to 9 of Table 3 show that our results remain robust when we use the Fama and French 
(2015) five-factor model to account for the impact of profitability and investment on lottery 
demand. 
B. Stock Return Predictability During the Financial Crisis 
Investors can exhibit a stronger propensity to gamble during financial crises (Kumar 
(2009)). If lottery stocks become more attractive during crisis periods, they could experience larger 
overpricing following a surge in gambling sentiment. In this subsection, we examine the impact 
of the 2008 financial crisis on lottery stock returns. 
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Specifically, we define the crisis period from July 2007 to March 2009, and estimate 
equation (2) for four subsamples: before the financial crisis, during the crisis, after the crisis, and 
excluding the crisis periods. We focus on the Long Short portfolio strategy. Panel A of Table 4 
presents the coefficient estimates when using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model as the 
benchmark. We find that all the four subsamples have similar mispricing pattern to that in Table 
3. In addition, consistent with our conjecture, the initial overpricing magnitude of lottery stocks is 
much larger during the financial crisis period. Economically, a one-standard-deviation increase in 
ASVI is associated with a significantly positive price change of 41 basis points in week 2, which 
is about four times larger than that in Table 3. Our results are similar when using the Fama and 
French (2015) five-factor model as the benchmark, as in Panel B of Table 4. 
Overall, the results in Tables 3 and 4 support the spillover hypothesis (H1). Lottery stocks 
earn significantly positive abnormal returns when investors have stronger gambling sentiment. The 
magnitude of positive abnormal returns becomes larger during the financial crisis. This is 
consistent with a positive spillover effect that investors’ gambling sentiment would generate short-
term overpricing among lottery stocks. 
C. Investor Demand for Lottery Stocks: Retail Investors 
Our results so far suggest that lottery stocks are overpriced when the overall gambling 
sentiment is high. However, we have not yet shown that shifts in gambling attitudes are positively 
correlated with investor demand. Without this direct link, our results may have alternative 
explanations, especially because the evidence in recent studies (i.e., Dorn et al (2014), Gao and 
Lin (2014)) indicates that gambling and stock market trading volume may be negatively correlated. 
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In this section, we test directly whether retail investors increase demand for lottery stocks 
following large jackpots. We use the actual trades of retail investors from a large discount 
brokerage house during the 1991 to 1996 period, and aggregate them to the daily level. 
To examine the impact of large jackpots on investor trading, we measure the retail demand 
for lottery stocks as the excess buy sell imbalance (EBSI) defined as the difference in the buy sell 
imbalance between lottery and non-lottery stock portfolios (Kumar (2009)).18 This measure 
captures the change in investors’ bullishness towards lottery stocks relative to their change in 
bullishness towards non-lottery stocks. We examine the spillover effect on the next trading day 
following a jackpot drawing. Specifically, we estimate the following time-series regression using 
all trade days during the January 1991 to November 1996 period: 
(3)         EBSIt = α + β1DtJackpot + β2MKTRETt + β3LOTRETt + β4EBSIt-1 + β5VIXt-1  
                                + β6ADSt-1 + CONTROLS + ϵt. 
The dependent variable is the daily excess buy sell imbalance for lottery stocks. Lottery 
stocks are defined as in Section III.C. The set of independent variables includes market return, 
return of the lottery stock portfolio, and lagged EBSI. Following Da et al. (2015), we also include 
the lagged Chicago Board Options Exchange daily market volatility index (VIX) to account for 
investor fear and market sentiment. Additionally, we include lagged Aruoba Diebold Scotti 
business conditions index (ADS) to capture the economic condition at the daily level since 
investors are known to have stronger gambling sentiment during economic recessions (Kumar 
(2009)). Control variables include lagged market and lottery stock portfolio returns (up to five 
 






, where the BSI for stock i 
on day t is defined as BSIit =
VBit−VSit
VBit+VSit
 . Here, VBit (VSit) is the dollar buying (selling) volume of stock i on day t, and 
Npt is the number of traded stocks in portfolio p on day t. Kumar and Lee (2006) show that an equal-weighted BSI 
measure is more appropriate for capturing shifts in investor sentiment than a value-weighted measure. 
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lags), day of the week dummies, and monthly time dummies. Standard errors are calculated using 
the method in Newey and West (1987). 
The key variable of interest is Dt
Jackpot, which equals to one on the trading day following a 
large jackpot, or zero otherwise. We define a jackpot as a large (i.e., attention-grabbing) jackpot if 
its prize is ranked within the top 50 jackpots at the time of the drawing. Large jackpots correspond 
to approximately 10% of all trading days during the 1991 to 1996 period. Table 5 presents the 
results. We find a significantly positive coefficient of 3% on Dt
Jackpot, which suggests that large 
jackpots generate 3% more net purchase of lottery stocks on the following day relative to non-
lottery stocks.19 
D. Order Imbalance for Lottery Stocks: Aggregate Effects 
In the next set of tests, we estimate equation (3) using TAQ data during the 2004 to 2014 
period. We follow the Lee and Ready (1991) method to define buyer initiated and seller initiated 
transactions, and aggregate them from the second level to the daily frequency. We measure the 
aggregate demand for lottery stocks as excess order imbalance (EOIMB) defined as the difference 
in order imbalance between lottery and non-lottery stock portfolios. Order imbalance of a stock is 
calculated as the difference between buyer and seller initiated trading volumes. Specifically, we 
estimate the following time-series regression: 
(4)    EOIMBt = α + β1DtJackpot + β2MKTRETt + β3LOTRETt + β4EOIMBt-1 + β5VIXt-1  
                     + β6ADSt-1 + CONTROLS + ϵt. 
 
19 We also examine the spillover effect from large Powerball jackpots in states that participated in Powerball during 
the 1991 to 1996 period, using zip codes to identify investor location. At the beginning of 1991, the Powerball lottery 
was offered in 15 states, which increased to 21 states by the end of 1996. In unreported tests, we study the subsample 
of trades after investor’s’ state offers Powerball. This leads to a 90% reduction in sample size, as large states in terms 
of stock trading such as New York and California are excluded. We still find a positive spillover effect in this small 
subsample, although it is statistically insignificant potentially due to the lack of statistical power. This small subsample 
could give noisy estimates of excess buy sell imbalance (EBSI) since relatively few households trade on a given 
trading day, and households can purchase Powerball tickets in neighboring states. 
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The dependent variable is the daily excess order imbalance for lottery stocks. We use the 
same set of independent variables as in equation (3). Standard errors are adjusted using the method 
in Newey and West (1987). The key variable of interest Dt
Jackpot is a dummy variable that identifies 
large jackpots (i.e., those ranked within the top 50 jackpots at the time of drawing), which 
correspond to approximately 10% of all trading days during the TAQ data sample period. Table 6 
presents the results. Consistent with brokerage results in Table 5, we find that a large jackpot is 
associated with 0.37% excess order imbalance for lottery stocks comparing to that of non-lottery 
stocks, which has a smaller effect than those from retail trading data as TAQ covers the aggregate 
market including trades by institutional investors. 
Overall, the results in Tables 5 and 6 show that large jackpots motivate investors to increase 
their demand for stocks with lottery characteristics. This evidence suggests that shifts in gambling 
attitudes have a positive spillover effect on the U.S. stock market. The result is different from that 
from Gao and Lin (2014), who find a negative impact of large jackpots on stock trading volume 
in Taiwan. Further, it is also different from that of Dorn et al. (2014) who report insignificant 
results for the U.S. using trading volume data from TAQ during the 2004 to 2008 period. 
The differences in results could arise from at least four reasons. First, using transaction 
level data, we directly study investor demand, measured by excess buy sell and order imbalance 
of lottery stocks following jackpots in the U.S., whereas previous studies analyze stock trading 
activities measured by trading volume and market participation. The evidence of reduced stock 
trading volume does not necessarily imply price pressure and return predictability as stock market 
investors could reduce both buy and sell orders following jackpots. For example, Gao and Li 
(2014), documenting a strong effect on trading volume from lottery jackpots in Taiwan, do not 
find a stock price impact. 
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Second, we use Google search volume to capture investors’ overall propensity to gamble, 
which contains value relevant information even after controlling for jackpots. If focusing on the 
effects of attention-grabbing jackpots on investors’ trading behavior, we also find a positive 
spillover effect. In contrast, the existing literature (Dorn et al (2014), Gao and Lin (2014)) use 
absolute jackpot size as a proxy for excitement. However, a large jackpot does not necessarily 
generate stronger gambling sentiment due to jackpot fatigue (see, e.g., Panel B of Figure A1 in the 
Appendix), which could bias their results against finding a positive spillover effect on the stock 
market. Third, we focus on a segment of the stock market which is relatively more likely to be 
positively affected by gambling sentiment, i.e. lottery stocks, whereas the prior literature studies 
the effects on the stock market overall, which could again bias against finding a spillover effect. 
Last but not least, investors in different markets may react differently to gambling 
sentiment. For example, lottery players in Israel tend to overreact to large jackpots (Beenstock and 
Haitovsky (2001)) whereas those in the U.S. and U.K. tend to underreact (Creigh-Tyte and Farrell 
(2003), Matheson and Grote (2005)). Similarly, stock investors in different markets could also 
react differently to gambling sentiment. Therefore, the substitution effects documented in Taiwan 
and Germany may not be directly extrapolated to the U.S. setting. 
E. State Level Gambling Sentiment and Return Predictability  
Next, we study whether cross-sectional differences in gambling sentiment shifts affect 
stock performance in the long term. We use the state level SVIs in the previous year for the topic 
“Lottery” to capture cross-sectional variation in gambling sentiment and form portfolios based on 
the gambling sentiment of the state in which a firm is headquartered. Specifically, we define value-
weighted portfolios for lottery and non-lottery stocks and then estimate the alphas of long short 
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portfolios using monthly return regressions that include the Carhart (1997) four-factor model and 
Fama and French (2015) five-factor model as the benchmarks. 
Panel A of Table 7 shows that lottery stocks significantly underperform non-lottery stocks. 
A trading strategy that Long lottery stocks and Short non-lottery stocks significantly 
underperforms the four-factor benchmark by 53 basis points per month. As expected, this effect is 
driven by firms headquartered in states with strong gambling sentiment, i.e., the Long Short 
strategy generates a negative return of -70 basis points per month (-8.4% per annum). In contrast, 
lottery and non-lottery stocks do not have significantly different performances when they are 
headquartered in U.S. states with weak gambling sentiment. We find similar results using the five-
factor model as the benchmark, as reported in Panel B of Table 7. 
We also examine cross-sectional differences among firms that are headquartered in states 
with strong gambling sentiment. Table 8 reports the long-term performance of stocks sorted by 
institutional ownership or local bias. Panel A shows that lottery stocks in strong gambling 
sentiment states have larger underperformance when the institutional ownership is lower. 
Specifically, lottery stocks underperform non-lottery stocks by about 2% per month for stocks with 
institutional ownership below ten percent. The return difference decreases to 55 basis points for 
stocks with above ten percent institutional ownership. In addition, Panel C shows that among 
stocks headquartered in states with strong local bias and strong gambling sentiment, lottery stocks 
significantly underperform non-lottery stocks by 74 basis points per month. In contrast, such 
underperformance does not exist for stocks headquartered in states with weak local bias even 
though gambling sentiment is strong. Further, we find quantitatively similar results by using the 
Fama and French (2015) five-factor model as the benchmark. 
Collectively, the results in Tables 7 and 8 support our second hypothesis. Consistent with 
our conjecture, we find that in regions with strong gambling sentiment, local investors are willing 
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to accept a more negative risk adjusted return for lottery stocks. This evidence is more pronounced 
among stocks with low institutional ownership or headquartered in states with strong local bias. In 
contrast, in U.S. regions with weak gambling sentiment, lottery stocks do not significantly 
underperform non-lottery stocks.20 
F. Gambling Sentiment and Stock Splits 
Previous finance literature has shown that firms are more likely to split their shares when 
stock prices are high (e.g., Baker and Powell (1992), Dyl and Elliott (2006), and Minnick and 
Raman (2014)). Our third hypothesis posits that an increase in gambling sentiment would lead to 
a higher probability of stock splits for stocks with high nominal prices. 
In this section, we use probit regressions to estimate the influence of gambling sentiment 
on stock splits. The dependent variable in this regression is equal to one if the company splits its 
shares in a given month, and zero otherwise. We control for contemporaneous and lagged stock 
returns, lagged firm size, and book to market ratio. We also control for split activities in the 
previous twelve months. Specifically, we run the following logistic regression: 
(5)  Probit (SPLITi,t) = α + β1DASVIt-1 + β2DPi,t-1 + β3DASVIt-1 × DPi,t-1 + β4RETURNi,t  
                                +  β5RETURNt-1 + β6SIZEt-1 + β7BMt-1 + β8SPLITTERi,t-12 + ϵt, 
where DASVIt-1 is a dummy variable that equals one if investors have strong gambling sentiment. 
Dpi,t-1 is a dummy variable of the price that equals one if a given stock is a high-priced stock. 
Following Baker et al. (2009), a high-priced stock has share price above the 70th price percentile 
 
20 We also examine to what extent idiosyncratic volatility could drive the stock performance results. In unreported 
tests, we find that while idiosyncratic volatility is an important factor for the return predictability of lottery stocks, it 
alone cannot fully explain the long-run underperformance of lottery stocks headquartered in strong gambling 




of all common stocks in the CRSP universe in a given month.21 Similarly, we define strong 
gambling sentiment as ASVI values above the 70th percentile of all previous observations. DASVIt-
1× Dpi,t-1 is the interaction between the price and the gambling sentiment dummy variables. 
Among other variables, RETURNi,t (RETURNi,t-1) is the return excluding dividends of 
stock i in month t (t-1). SIZEi,t-1 is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of stock i in 
month t-1 while BMi,t-1 is the book to market ratio defined as the book value of the firm over its 
market value. SPLITTERi,t-12 is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm split its stocks in the 
previous twelve months. Standard errors are clustered by firm and by date. 
The key variable of interest is the interaction between the price and gambling sentiment 
dummy variables. We expect that the splitting propensity would be higher when the share price is 
high and gambling sentiment is strong. 
Table 9 reports the estimation results. We find that DASVIt-1× Dpi,t-1 is positively significant 
in all specifications, which suggests that high-priced stocks split significantly more often during 
months following high gambling sentiment than during months following low sentiment, other 
things equal. Specifically, the predicted stock split probability following low gambling sentiment 
periods is 0.15% per month for high-priced stocks, which increases to 0.22% per month following 
high gambling sentiment periods, keeping other variables at the mean value. Hence the marginal 
effect (i.e. the difference between 0.22% and 0.15%) is 0.07%, statistically significant at the 1% 
level. This suggests that the probability of announcing stock splits for high-priced stocks increases 
by 0.07% per month following high gambling sentiment periods than low sentiment periods, which 
 
21 During our sample period, the average value of the 70th price percentiles is $31 with a minimum value of $13 and 
a maximum of $48. Our definition of high-priced stocks is also motivated by the minimum bid price requirements of 
major stock exchanges. Both NYSE and NASDAQ require listed firms to have a share price of at least $1. Firms that 
fail to meet this requirement can be delisted. During the 2007 financial crisis, hundreds of firms traded below $2. In 
2008 alone, 85 firms (10% of all listed firms in NASDAQ) were delisted from NASDAQ, mostly for not meeting the 
$1 price requirement. In general, firms trading in the sub-$5 range face substantial delisting risk. 
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is economically significant given the average unconditional probability of stock splits of 0.10% 
per month. 
In addition, DASVIt-1 is insignificant while Dpi,t-1 is significant at the 1% level, which 
suggests that gambling sentiment affects the split probability only when the share price is high. 
We also find that small stocks and stocks with higher returns are more likely to split, which is 
consistent with the existing evidence in the literature. Further, our results remain quantitatively 
similar when we use jackpot adjusted ASVI to control for the effects of attention-grabbing 
jackpots, as shown in Column 6. 
Overall, the evidence in Table 9 provides support to our third hypothesis. We demonstrate 
that investors’ gambling sentiment plays an important role in explaining the time varying demand 
for low-priced stocks. When investors’ gambling sentiment is strong, high-priced firms are more 
likely to split stocks to cater to the excess demand for low-priced stocks. 
G. First Day Return of IPOs 
In this section, we focus on our fourth hypothesis and examine whether gambling sentiment 
helps to explain the time variation in first day IPO returns. We regress the average monthly first 
day return of the net IPOs against lagged ASVI. Specifically, we estimate the following regression: 
(6)      RtIPO = α+β1ASVIt-1 + β2HOTNESSt + β3NtInternet + β4NtIPO + β5AGEtIPO  + β6SENTt  
                         + β7PEADt + CONTROLS+ ϵt.                                       
Following Ibbotson et al. (1994), HOTNESSt is the percentage of deals that priced above the 
midpoint of the original file price range in month t. Nt
Internet (Nt
IPO) is the natural logarithm of the 
monthly number of Internet IPOs (net IPOs) in month t. AGEt
IPO is the natural logarithm of the 
average age of IPO firms. We also include the Baker and Wurgler (2007) investor sentiment index 
and the PEAD factor in Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Sun (2019) to account for the effects of investor 
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sentiment and post earnings announcement drifts. Control variables include lagged average log 
price of all common stocks in the previous month, and contemporaneous and lagged value-
weighted return of all common stocks, as in Baker et al. (2009). 
Table 10 reports the estimation results. We find that the coefficient estimates of ASVI are 
positive and significant at the 5% level. A one-standard-deviation increase in ASVI (i.e., 19.7%) 
is associated with a 1.36% increase in the average first day IPO return. Relative to the mean first 
day return of 13.72%, this reflects an economically meaningful 9.91% increase. In addition, 
Column 6 shows that our results are similar after accounting for the effects of attention-grabbing 
jackpots. Consistent with our fourth hypothesis, this evidence suggests that when investors have 
stronger gambling sentiment, IPOs experience higher average first day returns. 
H. Robustness Checks and Alternative Explanations 
In this section, we conduct a number of robustness checks for our baseline results. First, 
we test whether our findings can be explained by other investor sentiment proxies. In Panel A of 
Table 11, Column 1 (2) reports the return predictability results without (with) the investor 
sentiment variable from Baker and Wurgler (2007). Our results are similar to the baseline return 
predictability estimates in Table 3, which suggests that our results on gambling sentiment cannot 
be explained by other investor sentiment measures. 
Second, search volume intensity from Google was publicly available only after June 2006. 
Column 3 shows that our return predictability results are similar for the subperiod that starts in 
June 2006. In Column 4, we also control for the market-wide investor sentiment for this subperiod 
and our results remain similar. Thus, the stock return predictability patterns that we document exist 
even after Google’s search data are made public. 
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Third, we test the robustness of the long-run underperformance of lottery stocks by using 
various (behavioral) asset pricing models. We first obtain data for the Stambaugh and Yuan (2016) 
four-factor mispricing model (M4 model, i.e., the market, size, MGMT, and PERF factors) from 
Stambaugh’s website (available till 2016) and report results in Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix. 
While Panel B of Table A3 shows that the negative lottery stock premium disappears for the full 
sample using the M4 model, the effect remains strong among stocks headquartered in strong 
gambling sentiment states with lower institutional ownership or stronger local bias (Panels B and 
D in Table A4). These results suggest that the M4 model does not fully explain the abnormal 
performance of lottery stocks headquartered in strong gambling sentiment states with more retail 
investor ownership or high local bias investor base. Further, the long-run underperformance of 
lottery stocks is robust to using the Daniel et al. (2019) three-factor behavioral factor (i.e., the 
market, PEAD, and FIN factors) model (see Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix). 
Fourth, we conduct several robustness checks for our stock split analysis. These results are 
summarized in Panel B of Table 11. In Columns 1 to 6, we include macroeconomic controls and 
our results still hold. In addition, we also use logit regressions to estimate our stock split tests and 
results remain the same (see Table A5 in the Appendix). Similar to the probit model results, the 
split probability for high-priced stocks increases by 0.06% per month during high gambling 
sentiment periods than low sentiment periods. 
In the last robustness check, we reconsider the first day IPO returns analysis, where we 
include five macroeconomic variables in the regression specification. Our results remain robust 
(see Panel C of Table 11). 
V. Summary and Conclusion 
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This study investigates how changes in overall attitudes toward gambling affect financial 
market outcomes. Using a novel measure of gambling sentiment based on lottery related Internet 
search volume, we show that the time variation in gambling attitudes predicts the returns of lottery 
stocks. Further, analyzing stock transaction data from a retail brokerage firm and the aggregate 
market data using TAQ, we show directly that investors increase aggregate demand for lottery 
stocks following large jackpots. 
Examining geographical differences in the impact of gambling sentiment on market 
outcomes, we find that in U.S. states where gambling attitudes are strong, lottery stocks 
underperform stocks that are otherwise similar in the long run. These effects are stronger for firms 
headquartered in states with strong local bias and firms with lower institutional ownership. 
The time variation in gambling attitudes also affects corporate financial decisions. 
Specifically, firms with high nominal share prices are more likely to split their shares when 
investors’ gambling sentiment becomes stronger. Stronger gambling sentiment is also associated 
with higher first day returns of IPOs. Collectively, these results suggest that shifts in overall 
gambling attitudes have positive spillover effects on financial markets. 
These findings contribute to the growing finance literature that examines the role of 
gambling in financial markets. Our paper adds a new dimension to this literature by demonstrating 
that time variation in gambling attitudes generates short-term mispricing and affects corporate 
decisions. In future work, it may be interesting to examine whether time varying gambling attitudes 
influence mutual fund flows. Mutual funds that hold more lottery stocks could experience more 
cash inflows when gambling sentiment is strong. It would also be interesting to examine the impact 
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TABLE 1  
Top and Bottom Gambling Sentiment States 
 
This table reports characteristics of the top and bottom five states in terms of the average state level search 
volume intensity for the topic “Lottery” from 2004 to 2018. SVI is the average state level search volume 
intensity. ANNUAL_SALES (reported in million $) is the total lottery sales value in 2017. 
PER_CAPITAL_SALES is per capital lottery sales in dollar value, calculated as state level lottery sales 
divided by state population in 2017. N/A indicates that the state has not legalized state lotteries by 2018. 
 
 
Panel A: Top Five States in Gambling Sentiment 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
State SVI ANNUAL_SALES PER_CAPITAL_SALES 
New Jersey 95 3005 338 
North Carolina 82 2259 220 
Pennsylvania 76 3721 291 
Massachusetts 74 5087 741 
South Carolina 71 1520 303 
Average 80 3118 379 
Median 76 3005 303 
 
Panel B: Bottom Five States in Gambling Sentiment 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
State SVI ANNUAL_SALES PER_CAPITAL_SALES 
Utah 9 N/A N/A 
Hawaii 9 N/A N/A 
South Dakota 11 153 175 
Montana 11 63 60 
Alaska 12 N/A N/A 
Average 10 108 117 





TABLE 2  
Summary Statistics 
 
This panel reports the characteristics of lottery stocks, non-lottery stocks, and other stocks. Lottery stocks 
are defined as stocks within the upper 30 percentiles of Lottery Index (LIDX) in each year. Similarly, Non-
lottery stocks are defined as stocks in the bottom 30 percentiles of LIDX in each year. Other stocks are 
defined as the rest of stocks in CRSP. NStock reports the average number of lottery, non-lottery, other and all 
common stocks in the CRSP universe in each month. PRICE is the average stock price. RETURN is the 
monthly average realized stock return. MARKET_CAP is calculated as stock price multiplied by shares 
outstanding, reported in million U.S. dollars. BM is the book to market ratio defined as the book value of 
the firm over its market value. VOLATILITYIdiosyncratic is the standard deviation of the residual from the 
four-factor model using daily returns in the previous year. SKEWNESSTotal (KURTOSIS) is the third 
(fourth) moment of daily stock returns. SKEWNESSIdiosyncratic is the scaled measure of the third moment of 
the residual from a two-factor model. N reports the number of firm month observations. The sample period 
is from June 2004 to December 2018. 
 
 
Panel A: Characteristics of Lottery Stocks   
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Lottery Stocks Non-Lottery Stocks Other Stocks All Stocks 
NStock 1,162 1,224 1,615 4,002 
PRICE 6.55 182.32 22.85 68.93 
RETURN 0.66% 0.83% 0.82% 0.78% 
MARKET_CAP  306.15 11,121.56 2,221.01 4,517.65 
BM 1.04 0.57 0.74 0.77 
VOLATILITYTotal 5.19% 1.89% 2.82% 3.25% 
VOLATILITYIdiosyncratic 5.08% 1.60% 2.59% 3.04% 
SKEWNESSTotal 1.52 -0.26 0.25 0.48 
SKEWNESSIdiosyncratic 1.59 -0.31 0.37 0.53 
KURTOSIS 14.80 4.77 7.28 8.78 









TABLE 2 (Cont’d) 
 
This panel reports the summary statistics of other variables for our empirical analyses. RIPO is the monthly 
average first day return (in percentage) on the net IPOs. HOTNESS reports the percentage of deals that 
priced above the midpoint of the original file price range. AGEIPO is the natural logarithm of the average 
age of IPO firms. NIPO (NInternet) is the monthly number of IPOs (Internet IPOs). All the above variables are 
obtained from Jay Ritter’s website. SPLIT is the monthly average splitting probability in percentage. 
UNEMP reports the U.S. monthly unemployment rate obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. UEI is 
the unexpected inflation (i.e., current month inflation minus the average of the past 12 realizations). MP is 
the monthly growth in industrial production obtained from the Federal Reserve. RP is the monthly default 
premium (i.e., the difference between Moody’s Baa rated and Aaa rated corporate bond yields) obtained 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. TS is the term spread (i.e., difference between the yields of a 
constant maturity 10-year Treasury bond and 3-month Treasury bill). IODomestic is the annual total U.S. 
institutional ownership. STD_DEV reports the standard deviation. We also report the 25, 50, and 75 
percentiles. N reports the number of observations. The sample period is from June 2004 to December 2018. 
 
 
Panel B: Other Variables 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables MEAN STD_DEV 25th_PCTL 50th_PCTL 75th_PCTL N 
RIPO 13.72 10.57 7.00 12.3 20.4 167 
HOTNESS 36.86 23.64 21.00 39.00 50.00 167 
AGEIPO 2.62 0.58 2.32 2.67 3.03 170 
NIPO 9.88 6.58 4.00 10.00 14.00 175 
NInternet 1.15 1.34 0.00 1.00 2.00 175 
SPLIT 0.10 0.11 0.03 0.06 0.12 175 
UNEMP 6.25 1.91 4.70 5.40 8.00 175 
UEI 0.00 0.33 -0.15 0.02 0.18 175 
MP 0.08 0.72 -0.24 0.16 0.52 175 
RP 1.07 0.48 0.82 0.92 1.17 175 
TS 1.81 1.03 1.11 1.91 2.54 175 







TABLE 3  
Stock Return Predictability Regression Estimates 
 
This table reports the predictive power of our Google gambling sentiment measure. We regress portfolio abnormal returns on the abnormal search 
volume intensity for the topic "Lottery":  
ARportfolio, t+n = α + βnASVIt + δFSIt+ εt, (n=1, 2, 3, 4). 
ASVI is the abnormal search volume intensity based on the time-series difference in log search volume intensities (see equation (1)). We estimate the 
abnormal return of individual stocks by 52-week rolling window regressions. We use the Carhart (1997) four-factor model (C4, in Columns 1 to 6) 
and the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model (FF5, in Columns 7 to 9) as benchmarks. We then form value-weighted portfolios of lottery and 
non-lottery stocks. Lottery and non-lottery stocks are as defined in Table 2. Firms in lottery and non-lottery stock portfolios are rebalanced every 
January while portfolio weights are adjusted every month according to market capitalization in the previous month. βn measure the predictive power 
of ASVI with n lags. We report the regression coefficients on ASVI (βn) for lottery, non-lottery, and long short portfolios, respectively. Long Short is 
a portfolio strategy that goes long in lottery stocks and goes short in non-lottery stocks. Columns (1) to (3) and (7) to (9) report the results using 
baseline ASVI while Columns (4) to (6) report the results using jackpot adjusted ASVI. FSI is the weekly financial stress index reported by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The sample period is from June 2004 to December 2018. N reports the number of weeks. The t-statistics computed using 
Newey and West (1987) adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
 C4 Baseline ASVI C4 Jackpot adjusted ASVI FF5 Baseline ASVI 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Weeks Lottery  Non-Lottery  Long Short Lottery  Non-Lottery  Long Short Lottery  Non-Lottery  Long Short 
1 0.126 -0.030 0.156 0.096 -0.033 0.129 0.014 -0.019 0.033 
  (0.424) (-0.965) (0.518) (0.332) (-0.902) (0.440) (0.046) (-0.830) (0.109) 
2 0.632*** -0.033 0.665*** 0.597** -0.029 0.626** 0.716*** -0.034 0.750*** 
  (2.587) (-1.190) (2.583) (2.154) (-0.958) (2.144) (3.278) (-1.429) (3.295) 
3 -0.136 0.002 -0.138 0.092 -0.007 0.099 0.046 -0.022 0.068 
  (-0.578) (0.054) (-0.548) (0.408) (-0.212) (0.405) (0.200) (-0.720) (0.282) 
4 -0.557** 0.058** -0.615** -0.710** 0.058* -0.768** -0.526*** 0.060* -0.586*** 
  (-2.326) (2.015) (-2.427) (-2.443) (1.934) (-2.528) (-2.772) (1.890) (-2.816) 





TABLE 4  
Stock Return Predictability Regression Estimates: Financial Crisis 
 
This table reports the predictive power of our Google gambling sentiment measure. We regress portfolio 
abnormal returns on the abnormal search volume intensity for the topic "Lottery":  
ARportfolio, t+n = α + βnASVIt +δFSIt+ εt, (n=1, 2, 3, 4). 
ASVI is the abnormal search volume intensity based on the time-series difference in log search volume 
intensities (see equation (1)). We use the Carhart (1997) four-factor model (C4, Panel A) and Fama and 
French (2015) five-factor model (FF5, Panel B) as benchmarks. We focus on a portfolio strategy that goes 
long in lottery stocks and goes short in non-lottery stocks. Lottery and non-lottery stocks are as defined in 
Table 2. βn measure the predictive power of ASVI with n lags. Columns (1) to (4) report the regression 
coefficients on ASVI (βn) before the financial crisis, during the crisis, after the crisis, and excluding the 
crisis periods, respectively. We define the financial crisis period from July 2007 to March 2009. FSI is the 
weekly financial stress index reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The sample period is from 
June 2004 to December 2018. N reports the number of weeks. The t-statistics computed using Newey and 
West (1987) adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimates. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: C4 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Pre-Recession Recession Post-Recession Non-Recession 
Weeks Long Short Long Short Long Short Long Short 
1 0.239 -0.138 0.163 0.177 
  (0.650) (-0.195) (0.394) (0.548) 
2 0.177 2.379** 0.651** 0.528* 
  (0.361) (2.122) (2.129) (1.940) 
3 1.100* -0.947 -0.475* -0.078 
  (1.904) (-0.847) (-1.727) (-0.303) 
4 -1.559*** -1.432 -0.208 -0.553** 
  (-4.051) (-1.361) (-0.774) (-2.168) 
N 161 92 508 669 
 
Panel B: FF5 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pre-Recession Recession Post-Recession Non-Recession 
Weeks Long Short Long Short Long Short Long Short 
1 0.552* 0.216 -0.170 0.013 
 (1.878) (0.352) (-0.439) (0.040) 
2 0.491 1.824* 0.716** 0.661*** 
 (1.242) (1.675) (2.583) (2.805) 
3 0.938** -1.571 -0.063 0.191 
 (2.486) (-1.104) (-0.214) (0.823) 
4 -1.082*** -0.198 -0.463* -0.620*** 
 (-3.285) (-0.197) (-1.806) (-2.980) 





Investor Demand for Lottery Stocks Following Large Jackpots: Retail Brokerage Data 
 
This table reports the daily buy sell imbalance (EBSI) of lottery stocks following large Powerball jackpots. 
We run the following time-series regression: 
EBSIt = α + β1Dt
Jackpot + β2MKTRETt + β3LOTRETt + β4EBSIt-1 + β5VIXt-1 + β6ADSt-1 
                              + CONTROLS + ϵt. 
EBSIt is the day t difference in the buy sell imbalance between lottery and non-lottery stocks. Dt
Jackpot is a 
dummy variable that equals to one on trading days following large jackpots, and zero otherwise, where a 
jackpot is defined as a large jackpot if its prize is ranked within the top 50 jackpots at the time of the 
drawing. Other independent variables include market return, return of the lottery stock portfolio, and lagged 
EBSI. VIXt-1 is the lagged Chicago Board Options Exchange daily market volatility index. ADSt-1 is the 
lagged Aruoba Diebold Scotti business conditions index. Control variables include lagged market and 
lottery stock portfolio returns (up to five lags), day of the week dummies, and monthly time dummies. The 
sample period is from January 1991 to November 1996. N reports the number of trading days. The t-
statistics computed using Newey and West (1987) adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses 
below the estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dt
Jackpot 3.263* 3.176* 3.201* 3.146* 3.101* 
 (1.835) (1.786) (1.789) (1.743) (1.724) 
MKTRETt 2.511** 5.378** 5.100** 5.075** 5.336** 
 (2.251) (2.093) (1.998) (1.993) (2.100) 
LOTRETt   -2.661 -2.436 -2.476 -2.759 
   (-1.345) (-1.239) (-1.255) (-1.397) 
EBSIt-1     0.036 0.036 0.032 
     (1.285) (1.287) (1.138) 
VIXt-1       0.272 0.357 
       (0.555) (0.736) 
ADSt-1         12.506*** 
         (2.707) 
CONSTANT 22.233*** 22.841*** 21.991*** 14.250 31.853* 
 (3.771) (3.921) (3.830) (0.955) (1.917) 
CONTROLS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  1,492   1,492   1,492   1,492   1,492  






Investor Demand for Lottery Stocks Following Large Jackpots: Aggregate Effects Using TAQ 
 
This table reports the daily order imbalance (EOIMB) of lottery stocks following large Powerball and Mega 
Millions jackpots. We run the following time-series regression: 
EOIMBt = α + β1Dt
Jackpot + β2MKTRETt + β3LOTRETt + β4EOIMBt-1 + β5VIXt-1 + β6ADSt-1 
                              + CONTROLS + ϵt. 
EOIMBt is the day t difference in order imbalance between lottery and non-lottery stocks. Dt
Jackpot is a 
dummy variable that equals to one on trading days following large jackpots, and zero otherwise, where a 
jackpot is defined as a large jackpot if its prize is ranked within the top 50 jackpots at the time of the 
drawing. Other independent variables include market return, the return of the lottery stock portfolio, and 
lagged EOIMB. VIXt-1 is the lagged Chicago Board Options Exchange daily market volatility index. ADSt-
1 is the lagged Aruoba Diebold Scotti business conditions index. Control variables include lagged market 
and lottery stock portfolio returns (up to five lags), day of the week dummies, and monthly time dummies. 
The sample period is from June 2004 to December 2014. N reports the number of trading days. The t-
statistics computed using Newey and West (1987) adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses 
below the estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dt
Jackpot 0.539*** 0.377** 0.382** 0.380** 0.373** 
 (2.682) (2.066) (2.046) (2.022) (1.999) 
MKTRETt 0.586*** -1.938*** -1.962*** -2.011*** -2.006*** 
 (12.420) (-10.063) (-10.248) (-10.546) (-10.508) 
LOTRETt   2.542*** 2.571*** 2.584*** 2.585*** 
   (12.875) (13.167) (13.343) (13.354) 
EOIMBt-1     0.086*** 0.085*** 0.083*** 
     (4.123) (4.133) (4.047) 
VIXt-1       0.075*** 0.069** 
       (2.680) (2.422) 
ADSt-1         1.354*** 
         (2.928) 
CONSTANT -12.649*** -12.451*** -11.411*** -12.594*** -12.048*** 
 (-41.915) (-37.959) (-28.793) (-21.670) (-19.863) 
CONTROLS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  2,664   2,664   2,664   2,664   2,664  





TABLE 7  
Stock Performance among U.S. States Sorted by Gambling Sentiment 
 
This table reports the performance of a value-weighted portfolio of lottery or non-lottery stocks. Abnormal 
return is measured as the intercept of monthly return regressions by using the Carhart (1997) four-factor 
model (C4, in Panel A) and the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model (FF5, in Panel B) as benchmarks. 
Full Sample reports the abnormal portfolio returns for all stocks in our sample. Strong (Weak) sentiment 
reports the abnormal portfolio returns of stocks headquartered in U.S. states with strong (weak) gambling 
sentiment. Strong – Weak measures the abnormal return difference between stocks located in states with 
strong and weak gambling sentiment. Strong (weak) gambling sentiment state group includes states with 
above (below) median search volume intensity for the topic “Lottery” in the previous year. The gambling 
sentiment sorted state groups are updated in January of each year. Long Short is a portfolio strategy that 
goes long in the lottery stock portfolio and goes short in the non-lottery stock portfolio. The sample period 
is from 2005 to December 2018. N reports the number of months. The t-statistics computed using Newey 
and West (1987) adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimates. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: C4 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Lottery Stocks Non-Lottery Stocks  Long Short 
Full Sample -0.505*** 0.024 -0.529*** 
 (-2.993) (0.869) (-2.847) 
Strong Sentiment -0.699*** 0.003 -0.702*** 
 (-3.761) (0.057) (-3.473) 
Weak Sentiment -0.182 0.062 -0.244 
 (-0.747) (0.841) (-0.939) 
Strong – Weak -0.518** -0.059 -0.458* 
 (-1.988) (-0.587) (-1.702) 
N 168 168 168 
 
Panel B: FF5 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Lottery Stocks Non-Lottery Stocks  Long Short 
Full Sample -0.292* -0.006 -0.286* 
 (-1.835) (-0.252) (-1.668) 
Strong Sentiment -0.484*** -0.046 -0.438** 
 (-2.748) (-1.063) (-2.399) 
Weak Sentiment -0.093 0.060 -0.154 
 (-0.359) (0.791) (-0.545) 
Strong – Weak -0.390 -0.106 -0.284 
 (-1.407) (-1.012) (-1.002) 





Performance of Stocks Headquartered in U.S. States with Strong Gambling Sentiment 
 
This table reports the performance of a value-weighted portfolio of stocks located in U.S. states with strong 
gambling sentiment. Abnormal return is measured as the intercept of monthly return regressions by using 
the Carhart (1997) four-factor model (C4, in Panels A and C) or the Fama and French (2015) five-factor 
model (FF5, in Panels B and D) as the benchmark.  Panels A and B report the long-term performance of 
stocks with different levels of institutional ownership (IO). Low (High) IO is the abnormal return of a value-
weighted portfolio of lottery or non-lottery stocks with less (more) than ten percent institutional ownership. 
Panels C and D report the long-term performance of firms headquartered in U.S. states with different levels 
of local bias (LB). Strong LB (Weak LB) is the abnormal return of stocks headquartered in the top (bottom) 
17 states sorted by local bias. Low – High (Strong – Weak) reports the abnormal return difference between 
the same types of stocks with different levels of institutional ownership (local bias). Long Short reports the 
abnormal return earned by a portfolio strategy that goes long in lottery stocks and goes short in non-lottery 
stocks. The sample period is from January 2005 to December 2018. N reports the number of months. The 
t-statistics computed using Newey and West (1987) adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses 
below the estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Stocks Sorted by Institutional Ownership (C4) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Lottery Stocks Non-Lottery Stocks  Long Short 
Low IO -2.036*** -0.006 -2.030*** 
 (-6.210) (-0.025) (-5.242) 
High IO -0.548*** 0.005 -0.553** 
 (-2.735) (0.110) (-2.562) 
Low – High  -1.487*** -0.011 -1.477*** 
 (-4.208) (-0.046) (-3.684) 
N 168 168 168 
 
Panel B: Stocks Sorted by Institutional Ownership (FF5) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Lottery Stocks Non-Lottery Stocks Long Short 
Low IO -1.883*** -0.097 -1.786*** 
 (-5.780) (-0.457) (-4.549) 
High IO -0.328* -0.043 -0.285 
 (-1.677) (-0.975) (-1.418) 
Low – High  -1.555*** -0.054 -1.501*** 
 (-4.456) (-0.249) (-3.770) 










TABLE 8 (Cont’d) 
 
 
Panel C: Stocks Sorted by Local Bias (C4) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Lottery Stocks Non-Lottery Stocks  Long Short 
Strong LB -0.670*** 0.073 -0.742*** 
 (-2.823) (0.826) (-3.029) 
Weak LB 0.315 -0.261* 0.576 
 (0.866) (-1.973) (1.398) 
Strong – Weak -0.985*** 0.333** -1.319*** 
 (-2.860) (1.999) (-3.296) 
N 168 168 168 
 
Panel D: Stocks Sorted by Local Bias (FF5) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Lottery Stocks Non-Lottery Stocks Long Short 
Strong LB -0.521** -0.017 -0.504* 
 (-2.042) (-0.196) (-1.940) 
Weak LB 0.315 -0.242* 0.557 
 (0.891) (-1.915) (1.376) 
Strong – Weak -0.836** 0.226 -1.061*** 
 (-2.407) (1.483) (-2.667) 






Gambling Sentiment and Stock Splits 
 
This table reports the results of our probit estimate. We run the following regressions:  
Probit (SPLITi,t) = α + β1DASVIt-1 + β2DPi,t-1 + β3DASVIt-1 × DPi,t-1 + β4RETURNi,t +  β5RETURNt-1 
                                       + β6SIZEt-1 + β7BMt-1 + β8SPLITTERi,t-12 + ϵt. 
The dependent variable is equal to one if a company splits its shares in a given month. Independent variables 
include a dummy variable of the abnormal search volume intensity for the topic” lottery” (DASVIt-1), a dummy 
variable of stock prices (Dpi,t-1), and their interaction term (DASVIt-1× Dpi,t-1). DASVIt-1 is equal to one if ASVIt-
1 is above the 70th percentile of all previous observations. Dpt-1 is equal to one if a firms' price is above the 
70th percentile of all stock in the CRSP universe in a given month. Control variables include 
contemporaneous and lagged monthly returns (RETURNi,t and RETURNi,t-1). We also include size (SIZEi,t-
1) and book to market ratio (BMi,t-1) at the beginning of the month. SIZEi,t-1 is the natural logarithm of the 
market capitalization of stock i in month t-1 while BMi,t-1 is defined as the book value of the firm over its 
market value. SPLITTERi,t-12 is equal to one if a firm splits its share in the previous twelve months. Columns 
1 to 5 report the results using baseline ASVI while Column 6 reports the results using jackpot adjusted 
ASVI. The sample period is from June 2004 to December 2018. N reports the number of firm month 
observations. The t-statistics computed using standard errors clustered by firm and by time are reported in 
parentheses below the estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DASVIt-1×DPt-1 0.350** 0.347** 0.347** 0.347** 0.349** 0.367* 
  (2.322) (2.107) (2.106) (2.162) (2.168) (1.859) 
DASVIt-1 -0.228 -0.228 -0.228 -0.229 -0.228 -0.288 
  (-1.493) (-1.352) (-1.354) (-1.398) (-1.396) (-1.466) 
DPt-1 1.046*** 1.081*** 1.123*** 1.090*** 1.092*** 1.106*** 
  (19.757) (18.442) (18.033) (17.034) (17.041) (17.885) 
RETURNt  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
   (4.442) (4.388) (5.630) (5.628) (5.792) 
RETURNt-1  0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
   (6.061) (6.136) (5.649) (5.635) (5.734) 
SIZEt-1   -0.015* -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.040*** 
    (-1.864) (-4.388) (-4.280) (-4.326) 
BMt-1    -0.747*** -0.756*** -0.755*** 
     (-12.232) (-12.220) (-12.135) 
SPLITTERt-12     -0.198* -0.196* 
      (-1.901) (-1.899) 
CONSTANT -3.789*** -3.833*** -3.751*** -3.238*** -3.236*** -3.233*** 
  (-64.500) (-58.556) (-45.000) (-35.876) (-35.700) (-36.561) 
N 663,619 657,578 654,778 654,778 654,778 654,778 




TABLE 10  
Gambling Sentiment and First Day IPO Returns 
 
This table reports the predictive power of our gambling sentiment measure on first day returns of initial 
public offerings (IPOs). We run the following regressions: 
RtIPO = α+β1ASVIt-1 + β2HOTNESSt + β3Nt
Internet + β4Nt
IPO + β5AGEtIPO  + β6SENTt 
                                                 + β7PEADt + CONTROLS+ ϵt.  
The dependent variable is the monthly average first day return on the net IPOs obtained from Jay Ritter’s 
website. Net IPOs are IPOs excluding closed end funds, REITs, acquisition companies, stocks with offer 
prices below $5, ADRs, limited partnerships, units, banks and S&Ls, and those not listed on CRSP. First 
day return is calculated as the percentage return from the offering price to the first closing bid price. The 
monthly average first day return is calculated as the equal-weighted average of the first day returns on all 
the offerings in a calendar month. Independent variables are the abnormal search volume intensity for the 
topic “Lottery” in the previous month (ASVIt-1). We include the hotness of IPO market (HOTNESSt, i.e., 
the percentage of deals that priced above the midpoint of the original file price range), monthly number of 
Internet IPOs (Nt
Internet), monthly number of IPOs (Nt
IPO), and the natural logarithm of average age of IPO 
firms (AGEtIPO) as control variables. We also control for the Baker and Wurgler (2007) investor sentiment 
index (SENTt) and the PEAD factor in Daniel et al. (2019). Other control variables include average log 
price in the previous month, and contemporaneous and lagged value-weighted returns excluding dividends 
of all common stocks in the CRSP universe. Columns 1 to 5 report the results using baseline ASVI while 
Column 6 reports the results using jackpot adjusted ASVI.  The sample period is from June 2004 to 
December 2018. N reports the number of months. The t-statistics computed using Newey and West (1987) 
adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ASVIt-1 6.890** 6.884** 6.933** 6.819** 6.910** 7.707* 
  (1.977) (1.985) (1.975) (1.988) (2.152) (1.857) 
HOTNESSt 0.221*** 0.221*** 0.221*** 0.219*** 0.221*** 0.220*** 
  (6.655) (6.624) (6.713) (6.657) (6.581) (6.503) 
Nt
Internet 1.344*** 1.357*** 1.332*** 1.320*** 1.342*** 1.321*** 
  (3.234) (3.303) (3.339) (3.208) (3.259) (3.130) 
Nt
IPO   -0.006 0.005 -0.031 -0.060 -0.058 
    (-0.054) (0.042) (-0.245) (-0.465) (-0.455) 
AGEtIPO       -0.337 -0.252 -0.565 -0.729 
      (-0.216) (-0.165) (-0.378) (-0.478) 
SENTt       1.901 1.381 1.441 
        (0.794) (0.594) (0.644) 
PEADt         0.770 0.770 
          (1.415) (1.437) 
CONSTANT -20.315*** -20.305*** -18.994* -19.628* -16.431* -15.824 
  (-2.945) (-2.906) (-1.850) (-1.964) (-1.655) (-1.590) 
CONTROLS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 167 167 167 167 167 167 








This table reports the results for various robustness tests. Panel A considers the robustness with respect to 
the predictive power of our gambling sentiment measure. The dependent variables are the future abnormal 
returns of a long short portfolio. Column 1 (2) reports the predictive power of our gambling sentiment 
measure without (with) investor sentiment index (Baker and Wurgler (2007)) as an additional control 
variable. Columns 3 and 4 consider the sample after June 2006, when Google’s search volume intensity 
data become publicly available. We use Column 3 in Table 3 as the baseline specification. Panel B considers 
the robustness of our results for stock splits. We use Column 5 in Table 9 as the baseline specification. 
Columns 1 to 5 include U.S. monthly unemployment rate (UNEMP), unexpected inflation (UEI, i.e., current 
month inflation minus the average of the past 12 realizations), monthly growth in industrial production 
(MP), monthly default risk premium (RP, i.e., difference between Moody’s Baa rated and Aaa rated 
corporate bond yields), or term spread (TS, i.e., difference between the yields of a constant maturity 10 year 
Treasury bond and 3 month Treasury bill) respectively as macroeconomic control. ALL (Column 6) reports 
the estimates by including all the five macroeconomic controls. Panel C considers the robustness of results 
related to IPO first day return. We use Column 5 of Table 10 as the baseline specification. Columns 1 to 6 
include macroeconomic controls. The t-statistics computed using Newey and West (1987) adjusted standard 
errors (Panels A and C) or standard errors clustered by firm and by time (Panel B) are reported in 




Panel A: Return Predictability with Subsamples and Investor Sentiment Control 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Weeks 2004 to 2018 2004 to 2018 After June 06 After June 06 
1 0.156 0.155 0.160 0.158 
  (0.518) (0.516) (0.458) (0.453) 
2 0.665*** 0.664** 0.641** 0.638** 
  (2.583) (2.563) (2.216) (2.185) 
3 -0.138 -0.139 -0.425* -0.427* 
  (-0.548) (-0.551) (-1.699) (-1.704) 
4 -0.615** -0.617** -0.379 -0.381 
  (-2.427) (-2.418) (-1.465) (-1.459) 
SENT_CONTROL No Yes No Yes 
N 761 761 656 656 
 
Panel B: Stock Split with Macroeconomic Controls 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 UMEMP UEI MP RP TS ALL 
DASVIt-1×Dpt-1 0.351** 0.349** 0.349** 0.343** 0.349** 0.341** 
 (2.177) (2.169) (2.169) (2.141) (2.162) (2.120) 
CONTROLS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 654,778 654,778 654,778 654,778 654,778 654,778 







TABLE 11 (Cont’d) 
 
 
Panel C: IPO First Day Return with Macroeconomic Controls 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 UMEMP UEI MP RP TS ALL 
ASVIt-1 6.792** 6.887** 6.468** 6.944** 6.843** 6.337* 
 (2.114) (2.136) (2.053) (2.139) (2.122) (1.966) 
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 167 167 167 167 167 167 








TABLE A1  
Gambling Sentiment 
 
This table reports the correlations between ASVI and variables that are likely to affect investors’ propensity 
to gamble, all measured at monthly frequency. The first set of variables include five macroeconomic 
variables: U.S. monthly unemployment rate (UNEMP), unexpected inflation (UEI, i.e., current month 
inflation minus the average of the past 12 realizations), monthly growth in industrial production (MP), 
monthly default risk premium (RP, i.e., difference between Moody’s Baa rated and Aaa rated corporate 
bond yields), or term spread (TS, i.e., difference between the yields of a constant maturity 10 year Treasury 
bond and 3 month Treasury bill). SENT is the Baker and Wurgler (2007) investor sentiment index. The 
jackpot dummy variable equals to one in months with attention-grabbing jackpots, or zero otherwise. 
Attention-grabbing jackpots are defined as those that break the national record or become the second largest 
jackpot at the time, or the largest jackpot over the past 24 months. Details of these jackpots are reported in 
Table A2 in the appendix. The sample period is from June 2004 to December 2018. 
 
 ASVI UNEMP UEI MP RP TS JACKPOT 
UNEMP 0.01       
UEI 0.02 0.04      
MP 0.01 0.03 0.05     
RP 0.03 0.35 -0.23 -0.49    
TS 0.00 0.71 0.00 -0.04 0.24   
JACKPOT 0.55 0.01 0.04 0.08 -0.03 -0.06  




TABLE A2  
Attention-Grabbing Jackpots  
 
This table provides details about the twelve attention-grabbing jackpots in our sample. ID corresponds to 
data points shown in Panel A of Figure 1. Date is the final drawing day of the jackpot. Value is the prize of 
winning the jackpot in million dollars. Game is the corresponding lotto game of a jackpot. Type indicates 
whether the jackpot is record breaking or near record. Record-breaking jackpots are the jackpots that break 
the national record at the time. They include the $1,586 million jackpot announced on January 13, 2016, 
and three other jackpots announced on February 18, 2006, March 6, 2007, and March 30, 2012. Near-record 
jackpots include eight jackpots that are either the second largest jackpot at the time or the largest jackpot 
over the past 24 months. Source: Mega Millions, Powerball. 
 
ID Date Value ($ million) Game Type 
A 19/10/2005 340 Powerball Near-record 
B 18/02/2006 365 Powerball Record-breaking 
C 06/03/2007 390 Mega Millions Record-breaking 
D 28/08/2009 336 Mega Millions Near-record 
E 04/01/2011 380 Mega Millions Near-record 
F 30/03/2012 656 Mega Millions Record-breaking 
G 28/11/2012 587.5 Powerball Near-record 
H 18/05/2013 590.5 Powerball Near-record 
I 17/12/2013 648 Mega Millions Near-record 
J 13/01/2016 1586 Powerball Record-breaking 
K 23/08/2017 758.7 Powerball Near-record 










TABLE A3  
Stock Performance among U.S. States Sorted by Gambling Sentiment: Robustness 
 
This table reports the performance of a value-weighted portfolio of lottery or non-lottery stocks. Abnormal 
return is measured as the intercept of monthly return regressions by using the Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Sun 
(2019) three-factor risk and behavioral model (BF3, in Panel A) and the Stambaugh and Yuan (2016) four-
factor mispricing model (M4, in Panel B) as benchmarks. Full Sample reports the abnormal portfolio returns 
for all stocks in our sample. Strong (Weak) Sentiment reports the abnormal portfolio returns of stocks 
headquartered in U.S. states with strong (weak) gambling sentiment. Strong – Weak measures the abnormal 
return difference between stocks located in states with strong and weak gambling sentiment. Strong (Weak) 
gambling sentiment state group includes states above (below) median search volume intensity for the topic 
“Lottery” in the previous year. Gambling sentiment sorted state groups are updated in January of each year. 
Long Short is a portfolio strategy that goes long in the lottery stock portfolio and goes short in the non-
lottery stock portfolio. The sample period is from 2005 to 2018 in Panel A and from 2005 to 2016 in Panel 
B. N reports the number of months. The t-statistics computed using Newey and West (1987) adjusted 
standard errors are reported in parentheses below the estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: BF3 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Lottery Stocks Non-Lottery Stocks  Long Short 
Full Sample -0.332 0.004 -0.336 
 (-1.424) (0.109) (-1.296) 
Strong Sentiment -0.494* -0.004 -0.490* 
 (-1.932) (-0.082) (-1.741) 
Weak Sentiment -0.162 0.011 -0.173 
 (-0.539) (0.158) (-0.542) 
Strong – Weak -0.332 -0.015 -0.317 
 (-1.146) (-0.154) (-1.091) 
N 168 168 168 
 
Panel B: M4 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Lottery Stocks Non-Lottery Stocks  Long Short 
Full Sample -0.039 -0.009 -0.030 
 (-0.213) (-0.266) (-0.150) 
Strong Sentiment -0.229 0.005 -0.234 
 (-1.155) (0.126) (-1.076) 
Weak Sentiment 0.227 -0.025 0.252 
 (0.724) (-0.331) (0.751) 
Strong – Weak -0.456 0.030 -0.486 
 (-1.387) (0.319) (-1.407) 






Performance of Stocks Headquartered in U.S. States with Strong Gambling Sentiment: 
Robustness 
 
This table reports the performance of a value-weighted portfolio of stocks located in U.S. states with strong 
gambling sentiment. Abnormal return is measured as the intercept of monthly return regressions by using 
the Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Sun (2019) three-factor risk and behavioral model (BF3, in Panels A and C) or 
the Stambaugh and Yuan (2016) four-factor mispricing model (M4, in Panels B and D) as the benchmark.  
Panels A and B report the long-term performance of stocks with different levels of institutional ownership 
(IO). Low (High) IO is the abnormal return of a value-weighted portfolio of lottery or non-lottery stocks 
with less (more) than ten percent institutional ownership. Panels C and D report the long-term performance 
of firms headquartered in U.S. states with different levels of local bias (LB). Strong LB (Weak LB) is the 
abnormal return of stocks headquartered in the top (bottom) 17 states sorted by local bias. Low – High 
(Strong – Weak) reports the abnormal return difference between the same types of stocks with different 
levels of institutional ownership (local bias). Long Short reports the abnormal return earned by a portfolio 
strategy that goes long in lottery stocks and goes short in non-lottery stocks. The sample period is from 
2005 to 2018 in Panels A and C, and from 2005 to 2016 in Panels B and D. N reports the number of months. 
The t-statistics computed using Newey and West (1987) adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses 
below the estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Stocks Sorted by Institutional Ownership (BF3) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Lottery Stocks Non-Lottery Stocks  Long Short 
Low IO -1.665*** -0.029 -1.636*** 
 (-4.896) (-0.125) (-3.941) 
High IO -0.378 -0.002 -0.376 
 (-1.385) (-0.038) (-1.262) 
Low – High  -1.287*** -0.027 -1.260*** 
 (-3.645) (-0.113) (-3.094) 
N 168 168 168 
 
Panel B: Stocks Sorted by Institutional Ownership (M4) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Lottery Stocks Non-Lottery Stocks Long Short 
Low IO -1.573*** 0.124 -1.697*** 
 (-4.297) (0.500) (-3.596) 
High IO -0.071 0.007 -0.078 
 (-0.323) (0.158) (-0.326) 
Low – High  -1.502*** 0.118 -1.620*** 
 (-3.738) (0.461) (-3.225) 









TABLE A4 (Cont’d) 
 
 
Panel C: Stocks Sorted by Local Bias (BF3) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Lottery Stocks Non-Lottery Stocks  Long Short 
Strong LB -0.444 0.093 -0.537 
 (-1.300) (0.970) (-1.503) 
Weak LB 0.572 -0.261* 0.834* 
 (1.405) (-1.895) (1.786) 
Strong – Weak -1.017*** 0.354** -1.371*** 
 (-2.828) (1.987) (-3.302) 
N 168 168 168 
 
Panel D: Stocks Sorted by Local Bias (M4) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Lottery Stocks Non-Lottery Stocks Long Short 
Strong LB 0.024 0.060 -0.036 
 (0.095) (0.753) (-0.135) 
Weak LB 0.878* -0.165 1.043* 
 (1.805) (-1.173) (1.972) 
Strong – Weak -0.854** 0.225 -1.079** 
 (-2.119) (1.315) (-2.391) 







Gambling Sentiment and Stock Splits: Logit Model 
 
This table reports the results of our probit estimate. We run the following regressions:  
Logit (SPLITi,t) = α + β1DASVIt-1 + β2DPi,t-1 + β3DASVIt-1 × DPi,t-1 + β4RETURNi,t +  β5RETURNt-1 
                                       + β6SIZEt-1 + β7BMt-1 + β8SPLITTERi,t-12 + ϵt. 
The dependent variable is equal to one if a company splits its shares in a given month. Independent variables 
include a dummy variable of the abnormal search volume intensity for the topic” lottery” (DASVIt-1), a dummy 
variable of stock prices (Dpi,t-1), and their interaction term (DASVIt-1× Dpi,t-1). DASVIt-1 is equal to one if ASVIt-
1 is above the 70th percentile of all previous observations. Dpt-1 is equal to one if a firms' price is above the 
70th percentile of all stock in the CRSP universe in a given month. Control variables include 
contemporaneous and lagged monthly returns (RETURNi,t and RETURNi,t-1). We also include size (SIZEi,t-
1) and book to market ratio (BMi,t-1) at the beginning of the month. SIZEi,t-1 is the natural logarithm of the 
market capitalization of stock i in month t-1 while BMi,t-1 is defined as the book value of the firm over its 
market value. SPLITTERi,t-12 is equal to one if a firm splits its share in the previous twelve months. Columns 
1 to 5 report the results using baseline ASVI while Column 6 reports the results using jackpot adjusted 
ASVI. The sample period is from June 2004 to December 2018. N reports the number of firm month 
observations. The t-statistics computed using standard errors clustered by firm and by time are reported in 
parentheses below the estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DASVIt-1×DPt-1 1.307** 1.392* 1.385* 1.356** 1.358** 1.468* 
  (2.082) (1.876) (1.876) (1.975) (1.979) (1.727) 
DASVIt-1 -0.942 -1.035 -1.030 -1.008 -1.007 -1.238 
  (-1.465) (-1.357) (-1.357) (-1.443) (-1.442) (-1.455) 
DPt-1 3.698*** 3.799*** 3.923*** 3.724*** 3.728*** 3.774*** 
  (17.686) (16.565) (16.647) (15.937) (15.947) (16.673) 
RETURNt   0.005*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 
    (7.228) (7.092) (7.913) (7.880) (8.295) 
RETURNt-1   0.009*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
    (5.494) (5.655) (6.351) (6.332) (6.410) 
SIZEt-1     -0.047* -0.124*** -0.122*** -0.123*** 
      (-1.842) (-4.344) (-4.221) (-4.268) 
BMt-1       -2.335*** -2.359*** -2.356*** 
        (-12.561) (-12.551) (-12.494) 
SPLITTERt-12         -0.571* -0.565* 
          (-1.734) (-1.713) 
CONSTANT -9.488*** -9.608*** -9.355*** -7.680*** -7.678*** -7.669*** 
  (-40.134) (-37.265) (-30.521) (-23.979) (-23.905) (-24.532) 
N 663,619 657,578 654,778 654,778 654,778 654,778 











Search Volume Intensity for “Lottery”  
 
This figure plots the time-series of the search volume intensity (SVI) for the topic “Lottery” in the U.S. 
region from 2004 to 2018. Points A to L correspond to the twelve attention-grabbing jackpots. We define 
attention-grabbing jackpots as those that break the national record or become the second largest jackpot at 
the time, or the largest jackpot over the past 24 months. The prize and date of the twelve jackpots are 
reported in Appendix Table A2. Source: Google Trends. 
 






FIGURE A1 (Cont’d) 
 
This panel plots the time-series of the search volume intensity (SVI) for the topic “Lottery” in the U.S. 
region from 2009 to 2014. Two Mega Million jackpots of similar sizes are labeled on the time-series: a 
$336 million jackpot in August 2009, and a $326 million jackpot in November 2014. Source: Google 
Trends, Mega Millions. 
 

















FIGURE A1 (Cont’d) 
 
This panel shows the geographical distribution of the search volume intensity (SVI) for the topic “Lottery”. 
Darker color indicates stronger search volume intensity. The intensity is calculated based on the average 
SVI during the 2004 to 2018 period. Source: Google Trends. 
 
Panel C: Geographical Distribution of Search Volume Intensity for “Lottery” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
